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Abstract: This paper develops a Walrasian equilibrium theory of establish-
ment level dynamics and matching frictions and uses it to evaluate the eﬀects of
congestion externalities in the matching process and determine the government
interventions that are needed to implement a Pareto optimal allocation. The
optimal policy, which involves a tax on the creation of help-wanted ads and an
unemployment subsidy, is highly contractionary. However, it leads to large welfare
gains. The policy also plays an important role in dampening the response of the
economy to aggregate productivity shocks.
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This paper develops a Walrasian theory of establishment level dynamics and matching frictions and
uses it to evaluate the eﬀects of congestion externalities in the matching process. The theory blends
together three important strands in the literature: 1) the Hopenhayn and Rogerson [6] model of
establishment dynamics, 2) the Mortensen and Pissarides [9] matching model, and 3) the Lucas
and Prescott [8] islands model. In my model establishments are similar to those in Hopenhayn
and Rogerson [6] except that the amount of hiring that they can undertake is determined by the
number of help-wanted ads that they posted during the previous period. Similarly to Mortensen
and Pissarides [9] unemployed workers and help-wanted ads meet according to a matching function.
However, wages are determined by Walrasian markets instead of bilateral Nash bargaining and
productions units are constituted by establishments instead of individual jobs. From the Lucas
and Prescott [8] model I retain the directed search speciﬁcation but assume that the search costs
are incurred by the establishments instead of the unemployed workers. These modelling choices
give rise to a uniﬁed framework for analyzing establishment dynamics, vacancies, unemployment
and matching frictions that fully relies on classical price theory. An important goal of the paper
is to evaluate if this type of framework can explain the behavior of U.S. labor markets both at
growth-trend and business cycle frequencies.
The economy is populated by a representative household constituted by a continuum of members
that value consumption and leisure. Household members diﬀer in their employment histories but
obtain full insurance within the household. The consumption good is produced by a large number of
spatially separated establishments that operate a decreasing returns to scale technology using labor
as the only input of production. The establishments are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks
that induce them to expand and contract over time. In order to hire a worker an establishment
needs to have a hiring opportunity. In the same vein, an unemployed workers needs to have a job
opportunity in order to become employed. Hiring opportunities and job opportunities are jointly
produced: They are obtained when an unemployed worker meets the help-wanted ad posted by an
establishment. The rate at which a help-wanted ad meets unemployed workers is determined by
the aggregate number of help-wanted ads and unemployed workers entering a constant returns to
scale matching technology. In order to retain a Walrasian market structure I assume that any of
the unemployed workers with a job opportunity can be hired by any of the establishments with a
hiring opportunity.I analyze this economy in a number of ways. First, I solve the social planner’s problem and
characterize the eﬃcient allocation. Second, I describe a competitive equilibrium that attains the
Pareto optimum allocation. The decentralization requires a large number of competitive matching
companies operating the constant returns to scale matching technology at a reduced scale. This
equilibrium is eﬃcient because the matching companies fully internalize the congestion eﬀects that
unemployed workers and help-wanted ads generate. Third, I describe a competitive equilibrium
with matching externalities. This type of equilibrium, which is standard in the matching literature,
speciﬁes that the search technology can only be operated at the aggregate level and that estab-
lishments and unemployed workers have free access to it. Since no decision maker regulates the
operation of the matching technology, congestion externalities arise and the competitive equilib-
rium is ineﬃcient. Fourth, I characterize the government interventions needed to attain the Pareto
optimal allocation in the competitive equilibrium with matching externalities. The optimal policy,
which implements a version of Hosios’ condition, involves a subsidy to unemployed workers and a
tax to the creation of help-wanted ads.
The quantitative results indicate that the competitive equilibrium with congestion externalities
is quite succesful in replicating the behavior of U.S. labor markets. In particular, parameter values
can be chosen to reproduce important long-run establishment level observations (e.g. the size
distribution of establishments, job creation and destruction rates, etc.) as well as aggregate labor
market statistics (e.g. the unemployment rate, the hazard rate of unemployment, the elasticity
of the hazard rate of unemployment with respect to market tightness, etc.). More importantly,
when aggregate productivity shocks of empirically plausible magnitude are introduced, the model
is found to replicate the observed business cycle behavior of output, employment, unemployment
and vacancies. Given the empirical success of this version of the model, it becomes important
to evaluate the magnitude of the congestion externalities underlying the matching process. I ﬁnd
that the externalities are quite large: Undoing them require a tax on help-wanted ads of 267%
and a subsidy to unemployed workers equal to 4% of wages. Moreover, introducing the optimal
policy reduces output by 6.2%, consumption by 5.5% and employment by 9.9%. Although the
policy is contractionary, the increase in leisure more than compensates the drop in consumption
and a steady state welfare gain of 0.8% in terms of permanent consumption is obtained. Once
transitionary dynamics are considered the welfare gain increases to 1.1% in terms of consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. Section 3 describes the set
of feasible allocations. Section 4 characterizes a Pareto optimal allocation. Section 5 describes the
2competitive equilibrium that decentralizes the optimal allocation. Section 6 describes a competitive
equilibrium with matching externalities. Section 7 characterizes the government intervention that
attains the Pareto optimal allocation in a competitive equilibrium with matching externalities.
Section 8 calibrates the steady state competitive equilibrium with matching externalities. Finally,
Section 9 presents the results.
2. The economy
The economy is populated by a measure one of households, each composed by a unit interval of
members called workers. Labor is indivisible: Workers can be either employed or unemployed,
and employed workers must spend a larger amount of time in market activities than unemployed











where ct is consumption, Ut is unemployment, ϕ>0, σ>0 and 0 <β<1. The parameter ϕ is
positive since the household is assumed to value leisure.
The consumption good is produced by a large number of spatially separated establishments.
Each establishment has a production function given by
yt = stF (nt),
where st ∈ S = {0,s 1,s 2,...,s max} is an idiosyncratic productivity shock, nt is labor, and F is a
twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave function with limn→0 F0 (n)=
+∞ and limn→∞ F0 (n)=0 . The idiosyncratic productivity shock st follows a ﬁnite Markov process
with monotone transition matrix Q. Realizations of st are assumed independent across all establish-
ments and st =0is assumed to be an absorbing state. Since there are no ﬁxed costs of operation,
exit takes place only when the idiosyncratic productivity level becomes zero. In every period, a
measure ς of new establishments is exogenously born. Their distribution over initial productivity
shocks is given by ψ.
Establishments can hire workers in a central island called the hiring market. However, the num-
ber of workers that an establishment can hire is constrained by the number of hiring opportunities
mt that the establishment has available at the beginning of the period. An establishment receives
3a hiring opportunity when one of its posted help-wanted ads meets an unemployed worker. Since
workers are assumed to quit at the exogenous rate δ, an establishment’s employment level nt is
constrained as follows:
nt ≤ (1 − δ)nt−1 + mt.
All workers that separate from an establishment (either because of quits or ﬁrings) join the pool of
unemployment.
Unemployed workers have the possibility of becoming employed in the hiring market, but only
if they have a job opportunity. An unemployed worker receives a job opportunity when he meets a
help-wanted ad posted by some establishment. Once in the hiring market, any unemployed worker
with a job opportunity can be hired by any establishment with a hiring opportunity.
The matching technology, which jointly produces job and hiring opportunities, is described as
follows. Let At be the total number of help-wanted ads in the matching technology, and let Ut
be the total number of unemployed workers in the matching technology. The number of hiring
opportunities obtained by an establishment that created at help-wanted ads is given by:
mt+1 = atm(At,U t), (2.2)
where m is assumed to be strictly concave, strictly decreasing in A, strictly increasing in U and
homogeneous of degree zero. The total number of job opportunities obtained by unemployed
w o r k e r si st h e ne q u a lt o
Mt+1 = M (At,U t),
i.e. it is given by the total number of hiring opportunities
3. Feasibility
In what follows, it will be convenient to index establishments by the date j of their creation, by their
history of idiosyncratic shocks st
j =( sj,s j+1...,st−1,s t) ∈ St−j+1 since the date of their creation
a n db yt h en u m b e ro fw o r k e r se that they were endowed with at the time of their creation. Only
establishments created at t =0are allowed to have a positive initial endowment of workers e.
Establishments created after t =0have a zero initial endowment of workers.1
1The “initial endowment” variable e is introduced to avoid carrying separate notation for incumbent establishments
at t =0and establishments created after t =0 .
4The number of establishments μ0 (0,s 0,e) created at t =0with initial productivity s0 and






creation date j ≤ t,h i s t o r yst
j and initial endowment of workers e satisﬁes the following equations:
μt (t,st,0) = ςψ(st),
μt (t,st,e)=0 ,f o re>0,
μt [j,(sj,s j+1...,st−1,s t),e]=μt−1 [j,(sj,s j+1...,st−1),e]Q(st−1,s t),f o r0 ≤ j<t .






































.T h i s
equation states that aggregate consumption is equal to the sum of output net of help-wanted ad
c o s t sa c r o s sa l lt y p e so fe s t a b l i s h m e n t s .



















i.e. it is the sum of help-wanted ads across all type of establishments. Unemployment is given by:



















i.e. it is the total number of agents that do not work.







since at the time of their creation establishments cannot employ more than their initial endowment

















5That is, the employment level of an establishment cannot exceed the sum of its previous employment
level net of quits and the number of hiring opportunities that it has at the beginning of the period.
4. Pareto optimal allocations
The social planner’s problem is to maximize (2.1) subject to equations (3.1)-(3.5). Since the
utility function in equation (2.1), the production function F and the matching function M are
concave, this is a standard problem. An analysis of its ﬁrst order conditions leads to the following
characterization.
An eﬃcient allocation can be described by a sequence {ct,A t,U t,v t,n t,a t,θt,γt,μ t}
∞
t=0.T h e
elements vt, nt,a n dat are functions of the state of an establishment (x,s),w h e r ex are the units
of labor available for employment at the beginning of the period and s is the current productivity
level. The number vt (x,s) is the date t shadow value of a worker at an establishment of type
(x,s),t h en u m b e rnt (x,s) is the date t employment level at an establishment of type (x,s),a n d
the number at (x,s) are the date t help-wanted ads created by an establishment of type (x,s).T h e
elements θt and γt are numbers: θt is the date t shadow value of a worker in the pool of aggregate
unemployment and γt is the shadow value of a next-period hiring opportunity.2 Finally, the element
μt is the date t measure of establishments across states (x,s).T or e p r e s e n ta ne ﬃcient allocation,
the sequence must satisfy the following conditions.
The shadow value of a worker at an establishment of type (x,s) must satisfy the following
equation:
vt (x,s)=m a x
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This equation is quite intuitive. The shadow value vt (x,s) cannot be less than the social value
of sending an additional worker to the pool of unemployment θt. Otherwise, welfare could be
improved by reducing the employment level of the establishment. If the shadow value vt (x,s)
exceeds the value of unemployment, the planner retains all workers available to the establishment
x. In this case, the ﬂow shadow value of a worker is given by the marginal productivity sF0 (x).
2All shadow values are expressed in terms of the consumption good.
6With probability δ the worker quits and his continuation value is the discounted shadow value
θt+1 of having an additional worker in the pool of unemployment at the beginning of the following
period. With probability (1 − δ) the worker does not quit the following period, and his continuation
value is equal to the expected discounted shadow value vt+1 of beginning the following period in an
establishment with (1 − δ)x + at (x,s)m[At,U t] workers available for employment. Observe that
the social planner discounts next period values using the product of the discount factor β and the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (ct/ct+1)σ.
T h eo p t i m a ln u m b e ro fh e l p - w a n t e da d sc r e a t e db ya ne s t a b l i s h m e n to ft y p e(x,s) is character-



















with equality if at (x,s) > 0. (4.2)
That is, if the establishment creates a positive number of help-wanted ads it must be the case
that the expected discounted shadow value of a worker at the establishment vt+1 is equal to the
shadow value of a next-period hiring opportunity γt plus the discounted shadow value of a next-
period unemployed worker θt+1. This conditions is also intuitive. If β (ct/ct+1)
σ E [vt+1] >γ t +
β (ct/ct+1)
σ θt+1, the value of increasing the establishment’s next-period hiring opportunities by
one unit exceeds the opportunity cost. As a consequence, welfare could be improved by realizing
this increase. If β (ct/ct+1)
σ E [vt+1] <γ t + β (ct/ct+1)
σ θt+1 even when zero hiring opportunities
are created, the social planner stays at the corner solution of at (x,s)=0 .
Substitution equation (4.2) in equation (4.1) gives






























The optimal employment rule nt (x,s) is then easily obtained. It is characterized by a threshold
level ¯ xt (s) that satisﬁes the following condition:




























7That is, ¯ xt (s) is the unique value of x at which the social planner is indiﬀerent between leaving
the marginal worker at the establishment and sending him to the pool of unemployment.
The optimal employment rule is then given by:
nt (x,s)=m i n{¯ xt (s),x}. (4.4)
That is, if x>¯ xt (s), the shadow value of a worker in an establishment of type (x,s) is less than
the shadow value of unemployment. As a consequence, the social planner reduces the employment
level of the establishment to the point at which he is indiﬀerent between making a further reduction
in employment or not.
The optimal help-wanted ads creation rule at (x,s) is also easily obtained. It is characterized
























0,i fmin{¯ xt (s),x} >x t (s)





The shadow value of a next-period hiring opportunity γt satisﬁes the following condition:
γt =
k
m(At,U t)+AtmA (At,U t)
. (4.7)
Observe that m + A.mA > 0 is the marginal product of a help-wanted ad in creating next-period
hiring opportunities. Since k is the cost of creating a help-wanted ad, equation (4.7) states that
the shadow value of a next-period hiring opportunity equals its cost of production.
The shadow value of an unemployed worker θt is given by
θt = cσ






Observe that AmU is the marginal product of an unemployed worker in creating next-period hiring
opportunities, which are valued at the shadow price γt. Thus equation (4.8) states that the shadow
value of an unemployed worker θt is equal to his value of leisure expressed in consumption units
8cσ
t ϕ, plus his shadow value in creating next period hiring opportunities γtAtmU, plus the discounted
shadow value of being an unemployed worker during the following period.




[stF [nt (x,s)] − kat (x,s)]μt (dx,s), (4.9)




at (x,s)μt (dx,s), (4.10)




nt (x,s)μt (dx,s). (4.11)
















where I (X0) is an indicator function that takes a value equal to one if 0 ∈ X0 and a value of zero,
otherwise, and Bt (s) is the set of all x such that (1 − δ)x+at (x,s)m(At,U t) lies in the Borel set
X0.
An eﬃcient allocation is a sequence {ct,A t,U t,v t,n t,a t,θt,γt,μ t}
∞
t=0 such that equations (4.1)-
(4.12) hold, with μ0 given. Observe that, from the concavity of the planner’s problem, a unique
eﬃcient allocation exists.
5. A competitive equilibrium
In what follows I specify a competitive equilibrium in which workers are bought and sold as capital
goods.3 Establishments buy workers in the hiring market, sell them in the ﬁring market and
buy hiring opportunities from matching companies. Households buy workers in the ﬁring market,
sell them in the hiring market, rent unemployed workers to the matching companies, and receive
3I choose this unusual speciﬁcation because it easy to describe. It turns out that it is equivalent to a much
more complicated speciﬁcation in which households and establishments trade binding state contingent employment
contracts (see Alvarez and Veracierto [1] for this alternative formulation).
9job-opportunities for free. Since at every period of time, there is always some positive number
of establishments that do not use all the hiring opportunities available to them (because their
productivity shocks have changed), the price of a worker in the hiring market is always brought
down to the price in the ﬁring market. Hereon, I will refer to this single price as the price of a
worker pw
t in the labor market.
The date t problem of an establishment that has e workers carried over from the previous period,
m hiring opportunities and current productivity level s is given by:
























nt = e + ht − ft
ht ≤ m
where pw
t is the price of a worker, qh
t is the price of a hiring opportunity in the next period, nt is the
employment level of the establishment, ht i st h ea m o u n to fh i r i n g ,ft i st h ea m o u n to fﬁring, mt+1
is the number of hiring opportunities that the establishment purchases, it is the interest rate, and
Jt (e,m,s) is the present expected discounted value at date t of an establishment of type (e,m,s)
after quits have taken place. Observe that an establishment maximizes the present discounted value
of its proﬁts, which are given by the sum of its output and its net sale of workers, minus the value
of the hiring opportunities that the establishment buys in the matching market. Also observe that
the amount of hiring cannot exceed the number of hiring opportunities available at the beginning
of the period.
It is straightforward to show that Jet = Jmt +pw
t .M o r e o v e r ,Jet and Jmt depend on (e,m) only
through the sum x = e+m. Using these properties, the ﬁrst order conditions for the establishment’s
problem can be written as follows:






































with equality if mt+1 (x,s) > 0.
The establishment’s employment rule nt (x,s) is similar to that of the social planner. It is
characterized by a threshold level ¯ xt (s) that satisﬁes the following condition:
pw

























The optimal employment rule is then given by
nt (x,s)=m i n{¯ xt (s),x}. (5.5)
The optimal hiring opportunities creation rule is also easily obtained. It is characterized by a






















0,i fmin{¯ xt (s),x} >x t (s)





The problem of a household that had ut−1 unemployed workers during the previous period and
that during the current period has jt job opportunities and bt bond holdings is the following:





+ ϕut + βHt+1 (ut,j t+1,b t+1)
¾
11subject to
ct + bt+1 ≤ pm
t ut + pw
t (ht − ft)+( 1+it−1)bt + Πt
ut =( ut−1 − jt)+ft +( jt − ht)
ht ≤ jt




where ut is the number of unemployed members during the current period, ht are the household
members sold in the hiring market, ft are the household members bought in the ﬁring market and
Πt are the proﬁts of all the establishments in the economy. The ﬁrst constraint is the household’s
budget constraint. Observe that the household receives income from renting unemployed members
to the matching companies pm
t ut, from the selling of workers in the hiring market pw
t ht,f r o m
interest and principal payments on its bond holdings (1 + it−1)bt and from the establishments’
proﬁts Πt. The household spends its income in purchasing workers in the ﬁring market pw
t ft,
on consumption ct a n do nn e x tp e r i o db o n dh o l d i n g sbt+1.The second constraint states that the
number of unemployed members during the current period ut is given by the number of unemployed
members in the previous period that were left unmatched ut−1 − jt, by the household members
bought in the ﬁring market ft, and by the household members left unsold in the hiring market
jt − ht. The third constraint states that the number of household members sold in the hiring
market ht cannot exceed the job-opportunities available to the household at the beginning of the
period jt. The fourth constraint states that the number of household members bought in the ﬁring
market ft cannot exceed the number of household members that were employed during the previous
period 1−ut−1. The last constraint states that the number of job opportunities that the household
will have the following period is given by the number of unemployed members during the current
period times the rate at which the representative ﬁrm creates job-opportunities.
Observe that the third and fourth constraints must hold with strict inequality at equilibrium.
For these constraints not to bind, the household must view its problem as being independent of its
job-opportunities jt. This requires that
pw
t = cσ








12This condition states that the household must be indiﬀerent between selling workers in the hiring
market and keeping them unemployed. The left hand side is the price pw
t that the household can
get by selling an unemployed worker in the hiring market. The right hand side is the sum of the
value of leisure expressed in consumption units cσ
t ϕ, the rental price of an unemployed worker in the
matching industry pm
t , and the savings from buying one less unemployed worker in the ﬁring market
















i.e. that the interest rate be equal to the marginal rate of substitution between current consumption
and future consumption.




t Mt+1 − pm
t Ut − kAt
o
subject to
Mt+1 = Atm(At,U t).
That is, the matching company obtains revenues qh
t Mt+1 from selling next period hiring opportu-
nities, pays pm
t Ut for renting unemployed workers and pays kAt for creating help-wanted ads. The
ﬁrst order conditions to this problem are the following:
qh
t [m(At,U t)+AtmA (At,U t)] = k, (5.10)
qh
t AtmU (At,U t)=pm
t . (5.11)
The ﬁrst equation states that the marginal revenue product of a help-wanted ad equals its marginal
cost k. The second equation states that the marginal revenue product of an unemployed worker
equals its marginal cost pm
t .
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence
©
ct,b t,A t,U t,J et,n t,a t,m t+1,p w
t ,qh
t ,p m
t ,i t,μ t
ª∞
t=0 such





13and equations (5.2)-(5.11) and (4.9)-(4.12) are satisﬁed every period t,w i t hμ0 given.
The following proposition states that every competitive equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient.
Proposition 5.1. (First Welfare Theorem) Let
©
ct,b t,A t,U t,J et,n t,a t,m t+1,p w
t ,qh
t ,p m
t ,i t,μ t
ª∞
t=0






Then, {ct,A t,U t,v t,n t,a t,θt,γt,μ t}
∞
t=0 is an eﬃcient allocation.
Since there is a unique eﬃcient allocation, a corollary of this proposition is that there is a unique
competitive equilibrium. The following proposition states that the Second Welfare Theorem also
holds.
Proposition 5.2. (Second Welfare Theorem) Let {ct,A t,U t,v t,n t,a t,θt,γt,μ t}
∞







t = γtAtmU (At,U t)
Jet = vt











ct,b t,A t,U t,J et,n t,a t,m t+1,p w
t ,qh
t ,p m
t ,i t,μ t
ª∞
t=0 is a competitive equilibrium.
Both propositions follow from comparing ﬁrst order conditions for the social planner’s problem
and the competitive equilibrium.
146. A competitive equilibrium with congestion externalities
This section describes the standard notion of equilibrium considered by the matching literature:
One in which the matching process is subject to congestion externalities. In particular, the matching
technology is now assumed to operate only at the aggregate level. Moreover, all help-wanted ads
and all unemployed workers in the economy are assumed to be inputs to it. Since no decision
maker internalizes the operation of the matching technology, standard congestion externalities
arise. Establishments buy workers in the hiring market, sell them in the ﬁring market and buy
help-wanted ads from job-posting companies. Households buy workers in the ﬁring market and sell
them in the hiring market. Since not all hiring opportunities are used in equilibrium, the price of
aw o r k e rpw
t must be the same in the hiring market and in the ﬁring market.
The date t problem of an establishment that has e workers carried over from the previous period,
m hiring opportunities and current productivity level s is given by
Jt (e,m,s)= m a x
nt,ht,ft,at
{sF(nt)+pw




















nt = e + ht − ft
ht ≤ m
mt+1 = atm(At,U t)
where ht is the number of workers bought in the hiring market, ft is the number of workers sold in
the ﬁring market, at is the number of help-wanted ads purchased, pa
t is the price of a help-wanted
ad, it is the interest rate and mt+1 is the number of hiring opportunities that the establishment
generates. Observe that the number of hiring opportunities that the establishment generates mt+1
is proportionate to the number of help-wanted ads purchased at, with constant of proportionality
given by the aggregate eﬀectiveness of help-wanted ads in generating hiring opportunities m(At,U t).
The establishment takes At and Ut as given. Also, observe that the amount of hiring ht cannot
exceed the hiring opportunities available to the establishment at the beginning of the period.
It is straightforward to show that Jet = Jmt +pw
t .M o r e o v e r ,Jet and Jmt depend on (e,m) only
15through the sum x = e+m. Using these properties, the ﬁrst order conditions for the establishment’s
problem can be written as follows:








































with equality if at (x,s) > 0. (6.2)
The establishment’s employment rule nt (x,s) has the same form as in the previous sections. It
is characterized by a threshold level ¯ xt (s) that satisﬁes the following condition:
pw



























The optimal employment rule is then given by
nt (x,s)=m i n{¯ xt (s),x}. (6.4)
The optimal hiring opportunities creation rule also has the same form as before. It is charac-

























0,i fmin{¯ xt (s),x} >x t (s)









t is the price of a help-wanted ad, k is the cost of producing a help-wanted ad, and At are
the total help-wanted ads produced. Thus, at equilibrium we must have that
pa
t = k (6.7)
The date t problem of a household that had ut−1 unemployed workers during the previous
period and that during the current period has jt job opportunities and bt bond holdings is given by





+ ϕut + βHt+1 (ut,j t+1,b t+1)
¾
subject to
ct + bt+1 ≤ pw
t (ht − ft)+( 1+it−1)bt + Πt
ut =( ut−1 − jt)+ft +( jt − ht),
ht ≤ jt,




where ut is the number of unemployed members during the current period, ht are the household
members sold in the hiring market, ft are the household members bought in the ﬁring market, and
Πt are the proﬁts of all the establishments in the economy. The household takes the aggregate
eﬀectiveness at which unemployed workers reach the hiring market.Mt+1/Ut as given. Observe
that the third and fourth constraints must hold with strict inequality at equilibrium. For these
constraints to be non-binding at every period t, the household must view its problem as being
independent of its job-opportunities jt. This requires that
pw
t = cσ







for every t. This condition states that the household must be indiﬀerent between selling workers in














t=0 such that bt =0and equations (6.1)-(6.9) and (4.9)-(4.12) are satisﬁed every
period t,w i t hμ0 given.
6.1. A myopic-planner characterization
Consider the problem of a social planner that maximizes (2.1) subject to equations (3.1)-(3.4) and
















¯ mt−1,f o rj<t . (6.10)
The planner takes the sequence {¯ mt}
∞
t=0 as given. Observe that equation (6.10) is identical to
e q u a t i o n( 3 . 5 )e x c e p tt h a tt h a tt h ea r g u m e n t so fm are taken as given. Given that this social
planner does not take into account how his decisions aﬀect m, I will refer to him as a myopic-
planner.
A solution to the myopic planner’s problem can be described by a sequence {ct, At, Ut, vt, nt,
at, θt, μt}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes the following conditions.
The shadow value of a worker at an establishment of type (x,s) must satisfy the following
equation:





















The optimal number of help-wanted ads created for an establishment of type (x,s) is charac-






















with equality if at (x,s) > 0. (6.12)
18The optimal employment rule nt (x,s) is characterized by a threshold level ¯ xt (s) that satisﬁes
the following condition:




























The optimal employment rule is then given by
nt (x,s)=m i n{¯ xt (s),x}. (6.14)
The optimal hiring opportunities creation rule at (x,s) is characterized by a threshold level






















The help-wanted ads creation rule is given by




0,i fmin{¯ xt (s),x} >x t (s)





The shadow value of an unemployed worker satisﬁes that
θt = cσ





θt+1,f o rt ≥ 0 (6.17)
A myopically-eﬃcient allocation with respect to {¯ mt}
∞
t=0 is a sequence {ct,A t,U t,v t,n t,a t,θt,μ t}
∞
t=0
such that equations (6.11)-(6.17) and (4.9)-(4.12) hold, with μ0 given.
In what follows, I provide a modiﬁed version of the Welfare Theorems, which I will refer to as
the Myopic Welfare Theorems.





19a competitive equilibrium with congestion externalities. Let




Then, {ct,A t,U t,v t,n t,a t,θt,μ t}
∞
t=0 is a myopically-eﬃcient allocation with respect to {¯ mt}
∞
t=0.
Proposition 6.2. (Second Myopic Welfare Theorem) Let {ct,A t,U t,v t,n t,a t,θt,μ t}
∞
t=0 beamyopically-
eﬃcient allocation with respect to {¯ mt}
∞
t=0. Suppose that



















t=0 is a competitive equilibrium with congestion exter-
nalities
The characterization of a competitive equilibrium with congestion externalities as a myopic-
eﬃcient allocation will turn out to be extremely useful in computations.
7. The optimal policy regime
In this section I introduce government policies to the competitive equilibrium with congestion
externalities of the previous section. In particular, I introduce a tax τt to help-wanted ads and
a subsidy ρt to unemployed workers. Any negative (positive) diﬀerence between the tax revenues
and the subsidy payments associated with those tax rates are rebated (taxed) to households in a
lump-sum way. The purpose is to look for government interventions that will attain the ﬁrst best
20allocation described in Section 4.
The date t problem of an establishment that has e workers carried over from the previous period,
m hiring opportunities and current productivity level s is now given by
Jt (e,m,s)= m a x
nt,ht,ft,at
{sF(nt)+pw




















nt = e + ht − ft
ht ≤ m
mt+1 = atm(At,U t)
where the purchases of help-wanted ads are now taxed at the rate τt.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the establishment’s problem are the following:








































with equality if at (x,s) > 0 (7.2)
The establishment’s employment rule nt (x,s) has the same form as in the previous sections. It
is characterized by a threshold level ¯ xt (s) that satisﬁes the following condition:
pw



























21The optimal employment rule is then given by
nt (x,s)=m i n{¯ xt (s),x}. (7.4)
The optimal hiring opportunities creation rule also has the same form as before. It is charac-

























0,i fmin{¯ xt (s),x} >x t (s)









t is the price of a help-wanted ad, k is the cost of producing a help-wanted ad, and At are
the total help-wanted ads produced. Thus, at equilibrium we must have that
pa
t = k (7.7)
The date t problem of a household that had ut−1 unemployed members during the previous
period and that during the current period has jt job opportunities and bt bond holdings is given by





+ ϕut + βHt+1 (ut,j t+1,b t+1)
¾
22subject to
ct + bt+1 ≤ ρtut + pw
t (ht − ft)+( 1+it−1)bt + Πt + Tt
ut =( ut−1 − jt)+ft +( jt − ht),
ht ≤ jt,




where unemployed workers are now subsidized at the rate ρt and the household now faces a lump-
sum tax Tt. Since the second and third constraints must hold with strict inequality at equilibrium,
the price of a worker must satisfy the following condition:
pw
t = cσ
















The government balances its budget period-by-period. This means that the lump-sum taxes Tt
must be given by
Tt = ρtUt − τtpa
tAt.( 7 . 1 0 )
A competitive equilibrium with externalities and policy intervention is a sequence {ct, bt, At, Ut,
Jet, nt, at, pw
t , pa
t, it, μt, τt, ρt, Tt}∞
t=0 such that bt =0and equations (7.1)-(7.10) and (4.9)-(4.12)
are satisﬁed every period t,w i t hμ0 given.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal policy intervention, i.e., the policy regime
that attains the ﬁrst best allocation.
Proposition 7.1. (Necessity of optimal policy regime) Let {ct,A t,U t,v t,n t,a t,θt,γt,μ t}
∞
t=0 be the
23unique eﬃcient allocation (as deﬁned in Section 4). Deﬁne,
τt = −
AtmA (At,U t)




















Then, {ct,b t,A t,U t,J et,n t,a t,p w
t ,p a
t,i t,μ t,τt,ρ t,T t}
∞
t=0 is a competitive equilibrium with external-
ities and policy intervention.
T h ec o n v e r s ei sa l s ot r u e .
Proposition 7.2. (Suﬃciency of optimal policy regime) Let {ct, bt, At, Ut, Jet, nt, at, pw
t , pa
t, it,
μt, τt, ρt, Tt}∞
t=0 be a competitive equilibrium with externalities and policy intervention such that
τt = −
AtmA (At,U t)












m(At,U t)+AtmA (At,U t)
vt = Jet
Then, {ct,A t,U t,v t,n t,a t,θt,γt,μ t}
∞
t=0 is the unique eﬃcient allocation
Observe that the optimal policy regime is fully funded: It does not require lump-sum taxes or
subsidies to implement it. It is also straightforward to verify that when the matching function has

















That is, while the optimal tax rate on help-wanted ads is constant, the unemployment subsidy
varies directly with the degree of market tightness.
This characterization of the optimal policy in the Cobb-Douglas case is closely related to Hosios’
eﬃciency condition in the context of bilateral Nash bargaining (Hosios [7]). To see this, observe that
Jet − pw
t can be interpreted as the surplus associated with the marginal worker. Hosios’ condition
states that the employer must receive a fraction 1−φ of this surplus in order to achieve eﬃciency.
Since in a Walrasian equilibrium the employer receives all of this surplus, a fraction φ must be taxed
away and be given to the workers in the form of an unemployment subsidy, eﬀectively mimicking a
higher Nash bargaining weight for the workers. An inspection of equations (7.2) and (7.13) indicates
that this exactly what the optimal policy achieves.
8. Calibration
Given that the preponderant view in the literature is that the matching process is subject to
congestion externalities, in this section I calibrate the steady state of the competitive equilibrium
with externalities and no policy interventions described in Section 6 to long-run U.S. observations.4
The following section will explore the business cycle properties of this economy as well as the eﬀects
of introducing the optimal policy regime.
I choose the model time period to be two-weeks to accommodate for the relatively short average
durations of unemployment and vacancies in the U.S. economy. Calibrating to an annual interest
rate of 4 percent, which is a standard value in the macro literature, then requires a time discount
factor β equal to 0.99835.
4A future version of the paper will also consider an eﬃcient competitive equilibrium scenario.
25T h ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e rσ, which determines the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, is
taken as a free parameter. However, I will restrict attention to two values: σ =0and σ =1 .
The ﬁrst value is often used in the search literature based on the Mortensen and Pissarides [9]
model (e.g. Hall [5], Hagedorn and Manovskii [4] and Shimer [11]). The second value, which is
consistent with the stylized growth facts, is general l yu s e di nt h em a c r ol i t e r a t u r e .I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,
I describe the calibration strategy assuming that σ =0 . At the end of the section, I discuss how
to accommodate the other case.
It is straightforward to verify that doubling the utility of leisure ϕ, the values of all idiosyncratic
productivity levels z, and the cost of creating a help-wanted ad k doubles the units in which
consumption and output are measured but leaves all other equilibrium variables unchanged. As a
consequence, I normalize the utility of leisure ϕ to one.
I assume that the production function has the following functional form:
yt = stnα
t ,
where 0 <α<1. Following the macro literature I choose the curvature parameter α to reproduce
a labor share in National Income (1 − β)pwN/Y equal to 0.64.
The values for the idiosyncratic productivity levels s, the distribution over initial productivity
levels ψ and the transition matrix Q are key determinants of the job-ﬂows generated by the model.
As a consequence I choose them to reproduce observations from the Business Employment Dynamics
(BED) data set, which is a virtual census of establishments level dynamics. Since BED data across
establishment sizes can be found for the nine employment ranges shown in the ﬁrst column of Table
1, I restrict the idiosyncratic productivity levels s to take nine positive values and choose them so
that all establishments with a same idiosyncratic productivity level choose employment levels in
t h es a m er a n g e .
The average size of new entrants can be obtained by dividing the total gross job gains at opening
establishments by the total number of opening establishments. Using data between 1992:Q3 and
2005:Q4, I ﬁnd that the average size of new entrants is equal to 5.3 employees. Since this is a small
number, I restrict the distribution over initial productivity levels ψ to put positive mass on only
the two lowest values of s and choose ψ(s1) to reproduce that average size.
Similarly, the average size at exit can be obtained by dividing the total gross job losses at closing
establishments by the total number of closing establishments. Using data for the same time period
26as above, I ﬁnd that the average size at exit is equal to 5.2 employees. Since this is also a small
number, I restrict the probabilities of transiting to a zero productivity level Q(s,0) to take positive
values only at the two lowest values of s and choose Q(s1,0)/Q(s2,0) to reproduce that average
size. The level for Q(s1,0) is then chosen to reproduce the average quarterly rate of gross job losses
due to closing establishments (JLD) over the same time period, which is equal to 1.6%.5
The rest of the transition matrix Q is parameterized with enough ﬂexibility to reproduce im-
portant establishment level observations. The only restriction that I impose is that Q(si,s j) > 0
only if j = i − 1, j = i or j = i +1 .S i n c et h er o w so fQ add to one this introduces 16 parameters
(2 parameters each, for i =2 ,...,8, and 1 parameter each, for i =1 ,9). Eight of these parameters
are chosen to reproduce the shares in total employment across size classes (which provide eight
independent observations). The other eight parameters are chosen to reproduce the shares in total
gross job gains across size classes (which also provide eight independent observations). I must point
out that the BED does not tabulate statistics across size classes in its regular reports. However,
these statistics can be found in Okolie [10] (Tables 1 and 3) for the ﬁrst two quarters of 2000.
These statistics together with the corresponding model statistics are shown in the ﬁrst panel of
Table 1. The second panel reports the average sizes at entry and exit both in the model and the
data. We see that the model does a good job at reproducing these observations. As a test of the
model, Table 1 also includes the shares in total gross job losses across size classes for the ﬁrst two
quarters of 2000 in Okolie [10], and the average quarterly rates of gross job gains due to expanding
establishments (JGE), gross job gains due to opening establishments (JGB), gross job losses due
to contracting establishments (JLC), and exit rates reported by the BED for the period 1992:Q3-
2005:Q4. Although the ﬁt is not perfect, we see that the model also does a good job at reproducing
these statistics.6
The exogenous separation rate δ and the number of establishments created every period ς are
important determinants of the worker ﬂows in and out of unemployment, so I calibrate them to
reproduce this type of observations. In particular, I target an average monthly separation rate from
employment equal to 3.5% and an average monthly hazard rate from unemployment equal to 46%,
5Since the model is bi-weekly, monthly and quarterly statistics are constructed following establishments over two
and six consecutive time periods, respectively.
6The main discrepancy is with the shares in total gros job losses for the size ranges (5,10) and (10,20),w h i c ha r e
too large in the ﬁrst case and too small in the second. This could be remedied by allowing for a postivive Q(s3,0)
and by lowering Q(s2,0), since the range (5,10) accounts for a large fraction of the establishments closings. However,
I do not expect that such modiﬁcation would aﬀect the main results in the paper.
27which were estimated by Shimer [12] using CPS data between 1948 and 2004. Since the separation
rate of 3.5% is signiﬁcantly larger than the rate of job losses experienced by establishments, I select
a positive value of δ to reproduce the excess worker reallocation.7 Also, observe that the separation
and hazard rates estimated by Shimer [12] imply a steady state unemployment rate equal to 7.1%.
The average size of establishments implied by the shares in total employment in Table 1 thus
determine the entry rate of establishments ς needed to generate an aggregate employment level N
equal to 0.929.
I assume that the matching function takes the Cobb-Douglas form in equation (7.12). The
matching parameters Ω and φ together with the cost of posting a help-wanted ad k are important
determinants of the role that vacancies play in the model economy. In fact, one of these parameters
entails a mere normalization: It is easy to show that dividing k by a factor λ, and dividing Ω by
a factor λ1−φ leaves the equilibrium unchanged except that the units in which vacancies A are
measured are multiplied by the factor λ. Given this result, I normalize Ω so that the units in which
vacancies are measured are such that the vacancy rate A/(A + N) of continuing establishments
equals 2.2%, which is the the average between 2000 and 2005 in the JOLTS dataset.8 This normal-
ization allows me to identify k with the cost of creating a vacancy. Since Hagedorn and Manovskii
[ 4 ]e s t i m a t et h a tt h eﬂow cost of posting a vacancy is 60% of the wage rate and since the wage rate
in my model economy is ϕ =1 ,Ic a l i b r a t ek to 0.60. In turn, I calibrate the curvature parameter
φ in the matching function (7.12) to 0.72 which is the elasticity estimated by Shimer [11].
As a test of the model Table 2 reports a set of basic monthly statistics both for JOLTS and the
model economy that were not used as calibration targets.9 We see that the model does a reasonable
job at reproducing the hiring and separation rates for continuing establishments, the vacancy yield
rate (i.e. the hires per vacancy), the fraction of vacancies with zero hirings and the fraction of
hires with zero vacancies. Time aggregation plays an important role in generating a vacancy yield
rate greater than one and the large fraction of hires with zero vacancies since, following JOLTS,
vacancies are measured at the end of a period and hirings are measured over the two subsequent
periods. The low rate of exogenous separations δ explains the model’s success in reproducing the
7Not surprisingly, my calibrated value of δ is smaller than the quit rate of workers measured by JOLTS, since
many of those separations entail job-to-job transitions that the model abstracts from.
8I restrict attention to continuing establishments because this is the only type of establishments included in JOLTS.
9JOLTS statistics are from Davis et al. [?, ?].
28fraction of vacancies with zero hirings. The reason is that a signiﬁcant number of establishments
reach the lower thresholds x(s) and start hiring just enough workers to replenish the exogenous
separation of workers. Since the monthly rate of exogenous separation is less than 1%, following
Davis et al. [?, ?], I classify these establishments (and their corresponding vacancies) as having
zero hirings. Observe that the model performs less satisfactorily in reproducing the fraction of
establishments with zero vacancies and the fraction of establishments with zero hiring. The small
number of idiosyncratic productivity levels that I allow for explains this result since they lead to a
large number of inactive establishments. Introducing more idiosyncratic productivity level would
generate smaller and more frequent adjustments and improve the performance of the model in this
dimension. However, I do not expect that this modiﬁcation to change the main results in the paper.
Table 3 displays all calibrated parameter values for the case of linear preferences, i.e. for the
case σ =0 . The other case is easily handled since at steady state the curvature parameter σ
only enters equation 6.8. In particular, when σ is greater than zero I leave all parameter values
unchanged except for the utility of leisure ϕ(σ) which I set to
φ(σ)=ϕ(0)c(0)
−σ , (8.1)
where c(0) and ϕ(0) are the steady state consumption level and the utility of leisure in the case
σ =0 .T h i s c h o i c e o f ϕ(σ) leaves the calibrated steady state allocation unchanged across the
diﬀerent values of σ. The values that satisfy equation (8.1) turn out to be ϕ(1) = 0.6846 when σ
is equal to one.
9. Results
Before analyzing the eﬀects of introducing the optimal policy regime to the calibrated economy of
the previous section, I evaluate the empirical plausibility of that economy by contrasting its business
cycle ﬂuctuations with those of the U.S. I do this by introducing an aggregate productivity shock




where zt is an aggregate productivity shock that evolves according to a standard AR(1) process
zt+1 = ρzzt + εt+1,
29and εt+1 is an i.i.d. normally distributed innovation, with zero mean and standard deviation σε.
Ic h o o s eρz and σε to reproduce the empirical behavior of Solow residuals in the U.S. economy
measured at quarterly frequencies. Using GDP and civilian employment data between 1951:1 and
2004:4 I ﬁnd that the logarithm of these residuals are highly persistent and that their changes
have a standard deviations of 0.008.10 It turns out that values of ρz =0 .96 and σε =0 .0044 are
needed to reproduce this type of behavior for the Solow residuals measured from the artiﬁcial data
generated by the model economy.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 4 reports business cycle statistics between 1951:1 and 2004:4 for GDP
(Y), civilian employment (N), civilian unemployment (U), the help-wanted ads index (A), market
tightness (A/U) and average labor productivity (Y/N). Before any statistics were computed all the
time series were logged and detrended using a Hoddrik-Prescott ﬁlter with smothing parameter
1,600. The statistics are the vector of standard deviations and the correlation matrix. We see that
employment and average productivity ﬂuctuate 0.60% as much as output, while unemployment
and help-wanted ads ﬂuctuate about 8 times as much. Market tightness is even more variable: it
ﬂuctuates 16 times as much as output. All variables are strongly procyclical except for unemploy-
ment, which is strongly contercyclical. We also see that the data displays a clear Beveridge curve:
Unemployment and help-wanted ads are strongly negatively correlated. The correlation of unem-
ployment with market tightness is also close to -1 while the correlation with average productivity
is much weaker: only -0.46.
The second panel of Table 4 describes analogous statistics from the model economy with linear
preferences.11 We see that the model generates only a slightly smaller standard deviation of output
than the data and that the standard deviations of all variables relative to output have the correct
magnitude. The correlations of all variables with output have the correct sign but they are a bit
too strongly correlated. We also see that the model generates the Beveridge curve, although the
correlation between unemployment and help-wanteed ads is a bit weaker than in the data. The
corelation of unemployment with market tightness is as strong as in the U.S. economy while its
correlation with average productivity is a touch weaker. Overall, we see that the model reproduces
U.S. business cycle statistics surprisingly well.
10Solow residuals were constructed using a labor share of 64%.
11The model with log preferences generates virtually no employment ﬂuctuations. Actually, if the cost of creating
help-wanted ads was e
ztk, i.e. if it was perfectly correlated with the aggregate productivity shock, the economy with
log preferences would generate zero employment ﬂuctuations.
30Having established the empirical relevance of the equilibrium with externalities, I now turn
to measure the consequences of the congestion eﬀects. In particular, I evaluate the eﬀects of
introducing the optimal policy characterized by Propositions 7.1 and 7.2. It turns out that the
optimal policy is given by a tax of 257% on the creation of help-wanted ads and an unemployment
subsidy equal to 4.4% of the wage rate (i.e. of the user cost of labor (1−β)pw). Table 5 reports the
steady-state results. We see that the optimal policy is extremely contractionary: output decreases
by 6.2%, consumption by 5.5%, employment by 9.9%, and vacancies by 91.7%. Matches increase by
13.4% despite the decrease in vacancies because of a sharp increase in unemployment. In fact, the
unemployment rate increases from 7.2% in the steady state with congestion externalities to 16.4%
under the optimal policy regime. Observe that the higher number of matches allow for higher rates
of job gains due to expanding establishments and job losses due to contracting establishments,
leading to a better distribution of workers across establishments. Also observe that the drop in
consumption is more than compensated by the large increase in leisure, and the optimal policy leads
to large welfare gains: Agents in the steady-state of the equilibrium with congestion externalities
would require a 0.8% permanent increase in consumption in order to be indiﬀerent with living in
the eﬃcient steady-state.
Figure 1 shows the transitionary dynamics generated by the optimal policy over the ﬁrst year
of the reform. There are two important features to observe. First, the transitionary dynamics are
rather slow: Only by the end of the year variables appear to be settling at their stationary values.
Second, unemployment jumps and help-wanted ads plummet immediately after the reform. While
output drops with the initial increase in unemployment, consumption is not very much aﬀected
on impact because of the large savings in help-wanted ads. Since consumption does not initially
change and agents start enjoying a signiﬁcant amount of leisure right away, there are large welfare
gains early on in the reform. This, coupled with the long transitionary dynamics, imply that the
welfare gains of the reform can be much higher once the transitionary dynamics are considered.
Table 6 shows that this is indeed the case: The welfare gains of the reform increase from 0.8% to
1.1% when the short-run eﬀects are taken into account..
Finally, Table 7 shows how the introduction of the optimal policy aﬀects the business cycle
ﬂuctuations of the economy. The ﬁrst panel reproduces the business cycle statistics for the equilib-
rium with congestion externalities. The second panel describes analogous statistics for the eﬃcient
equilibrium. We see that the optimal policy dampens the response of the economy to aggregate
producitivity shocks quite substantially. In particular, the standard deviation of output decreases
31by 3% and the standard deviation of employment decreases by 17%. However, the largest eﬀects
are in the volatility of unemployment, which plummets by 70%. Despite of this, the correlation ma-
trices indicate that the comovements between the diﬀerent variables are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected.
In particular, the correlation between unemployment and help-wanted ads only changes from -0.75
to -0.67, i.e. there are little eﬀects on the slope of the Beveridge curve.
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Panel A: BED data, March 2000 to June 2000
Size Data Model
Classes∗ Shares in Shares in Shares in Shares in Shares in Shares in
(employees) Employment Job Gains Job Losses Employment Job Gains Job Losses
[1,5) 6.4% 16.9% 9.7% 7.6% 15.0% 7.5%
[5,10) 8.1% 13.1% 11.6% 6.6% 15.7% 20.5%
[10,20) 10.7% 14.9% 13.7% 11.0% 16.3% 4.2%
[20,50) 16.6% 18.3% 18.2% 17.1% 17.1% 16.9%
[50,100) 13.1% 11.6% 12.6% 12.5% 11.7% 14.4%
[100,250) 16.5% 11.9% 14.6% 16.8% 12.5% 13.6%
[250,500) 9.8% 5.9% 8.5% 9.5% 5.0% 11.5%
[500,1000) 7.3% 3.5% 5.4% 7.5% 6.9% 5.6%
[1000,∞) 11.6% 4.2% 5.9% 11.3% 0.0% 5.9%
Panel B: BED data, 1992:Q3 to 2005:Q4
Data Model
size at entry 5.3 4.7





Exit Rate 5.2% 6.9%
(∗): The classiﬁcation of establishments into size classes is as follows: Continuing establishments
between t and t +1are classiﬁed according to their size at t, opening establishments at t +1are
classiﬁe da c c o r d i n gt ot h e i rs i z ea tt +1 , closing establishments at t +1are classiﬁed according to
their size at t.
34Table 2
Monthly observations
Panel A: CPS data, 1948-2004
Data Model
Separation rate 3.5% 3.6%
Hazard rate 46% 46%
Panel B: JOLTS data, 2000-2005
Data Model
Vacancy rate 2.2% 2.2%
Hiring rate 3.2% 3.0%
Separation rate 3.1% 3.0%
Vacancies yield rate 1.3 1.3
% Vacancies with zero hiring 18.7% 19.0%
% Hiring with zero vacancies 42.3% 58.1%
% Establishments with zero hiring 81.6% 90.0%
% Establishments with zero vacancies 87.6% 95.0%
35Table 3
Parameter values (σ =0 )
General Parameters:
βϕαδςkΩ φ
0.9984 1.0 0.64 0.0045 0.0006 0.61 1.493 0.219
Productivity levels:
s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
0.0 2.19 3.33 4.0 5.71 7.16 10.24 13.33 16.38 20.0
Distribution over initial productivity levels:
ψ(s0) ψ(s1) ψ(s2) ψ(s3) ψ (s4) ψ (s5) ψ(s6) ψ(s7) ψ(s8) ψ(s9)













s0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
s1 0.0007 0.8677 0.1317 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
s2 0.038 0.1384 0.82 0.0036 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
s3 0.0 0.0 0.0071 0.98 0.0129 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
s4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0223 0.953 0.0247 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
s5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0529 0.94 0.0071 0.0 0.0 0.0
s6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0165 0.971 0.0125 0.0 0.0
s7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0414 0.95 0.0086 0.0
s8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.022 0.955 0.023
s9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.024 0.976
36Table 4
Business Cycles (HP smoothing parameter = 1,600)
Panel A: Data (1951:1-2004:4)
Standard deviations
YN U AA / UY / N
1.58 1.00 12.32 13.95 25.71 0.99
Correlations
YN U AA / UY / N
Y 1.00 0.81 -0.84 0.90 0.89 0.79
N 1.00 -0.87 0.88 0.89 0.26
U 1.00 -0.91 -0.98 -0.46
A 1.00 0.98 0.54
A/U 1.00 0.51
Y/N 1.00
Panel B: Model w/externalities (linear preferences)
Standard deviations
YN U AA / UY / N
1.51 0.84 11.78 11.82 22.11 0.76
Correlations
YN U AA / UY / N
Y 1.00 0.95 -0.93 0.85 0.95 0.94
N 1.00 -0.99 0.71 0.91 0.77
U 1.00 -0.75 -0.94 -0.75





Linear Preferences Log Preferences
Externalities Eﬃciency Externalities Eﬃciency
output 100.0 93.8 100.0 95.6
consumption 100.0 94.5 100.0 96.3
employment 100.0 90.1 100.0 93.0
unemployment 100.0 227.6 100.0 190.9
vacancies 100.0 18.9 100.0 23.3
matches 100.0 113.4 100.0 105.9
vacancies/unemployment 100.0 8.3 100.0 12.2
output/employment 100.0 104 100.0 102.8
quarterly JGB 1.6% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6%
quarterly JBE 6.2% 7.4% 6.2% 6.9%
quarterly JLD 1.6% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6%
quarterly JLC 6.2% 7.4% 6.2% 6.9%
vacancies tax rate 0.0% 257% 0.0% 257%
UI replacement ratio 0.0% 4.4% 0.0% 6.5%








-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
periods since reform
consumption unemployment help-wanted ads matchesTable 6
Welfare eﬀects
Linear Preferences Log Preferences
Externalities Eﬃciency Externalities Eﬃciency
Steady state welfare gains 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.7%
Transitionary dynamics welfare gains 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 1.1%
39Table 7
Business Cycles Eﬀects of Optimal Policy (Linear preferences)
Panel A: Externalities
Standard deviations
YN U AA / U Y / N
1.51 0.84 11.78 11.82 22.11 0.76
Correlations
YN U AA / U Y / N
Y 1.00 0.95 -0.93 0.85 0.95 0.94
N 1.00 -0.99 0.71 0.91 0.77
U 1.00 -0.75 -0.94 -0.75
A 1.00 0.93 0.90
A/U 1.00 0.89
Y/N 1.00
P a n e lB :E ﬃciency
Standard deviations
YN U AA / U Y / N
1.46 0.70 3.60 8.50 11.22 0.86
Correlations
YN U AA / U Y / N
Y 1.00 0.92 -0.92 0.91 0.98 0.95
N 1.00 -1.00 0.67 0.83 0.75
U 1.00 -0.67 -0.83 -0.75
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